Nigar, can you tell us about your career background and your work in the Caucasus region? As far as I know, your connection with the region began after graduating from university, when you started working at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Washington.

My path to the Caucasus started somewhat by chance, and then evolved with the flow of life. I studied international relations at Koç University, but after graduation, I wasn’t quite sure what to do with my diploma. The most logical move seemed to be to start with gaining experience in Washington. While job hunting, I came across a position as an assistant to the Ambassador at the Azerbaijani Embassy. Back then, Azerbaijan wasn’t yet exporting energy, the pipelines hadnt been built, and thus Baku didn’t have the means it has today. The Embassy operated from a modest apartment floor, and the diplomatic staff were few—just six or seven. Suddenly, I found myself in a world I knew little about: intense lobbying in the U.S. Congress, energy giants trying to build ties with Azerbaijan—it was a dynamic environment. I learned a lot, and being far from home also stirred an emotional connection to Azerbaijan’s issues. 

At the same time, I became a target for the Armenian diaspora. Being Turkish and working at the Azerbaijani Embassy was, from their perspective, an ideological trigger. I began to wonder, are Azerbaijanis paying the price for what Armenians experienced in Eastern Anatolia (in 1915).  At that point, my grasp of history was very shallow—I was 22, it was 1998.

In 2001, I returned to Turkey and began working at TESEV with Özdem Sanberk, a former Foreign Ministry Undersecretary. We were organizing high-level regional cooperation conferences on the Caucasus, involving foreign ministries and semi-official dialogues that brought together academics, civil society, and media. These were bold and constructive platforms where creative ideas for overcoming geopolitical tensions could flourish. I served in the secretariat of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission and was also Turkey representative for IREX, an academic institution focused on Eurasia.

During this time, I came to see that Armenian actors weren’t monolithic by any means. There was diversity in perspectives both in the diaspora and in Armenia. I also gained a deeper understanding of the Turkish state’s positions. I built close friendships with figures considered the region’s wise elders—some of whom I still consider mentors. I developed strong bonds in all three countries—Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Perhaps that’s why building bridges in this region and searching for common ground feels to me like a personal cause as much as a professional responsibility.  

Later, while working for a European think tank, I spent time doing field research in Azerbaijan and Armenia—staying in remote towns and villages, and giving talks to student groups. These encounters, at times confrontational and at other times heatwarming, deepened my connection to the region

What sets me apart from many analysts is that I’ve experienced firsthand the entanglement of past and present across the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Armenia triangle. Many view Turkey–Azerbaijan relations as the core and fold Armenia into that framework; others focus primarily on Turkey–Armenia ties and interpret Azerbaijan through that lens. Also among Turkish analysts few have focused on bilateral Azerbaijan–Armenia relations. So maybe I see the intertwined aspects more, or have a less compartmentalised perspective of the parties’ narratives, identities, and strategic interests. 

For the past ten years, I’ve been Turkey Director at the International Crisis Group. I’ve had the opportunity to engage with top diplomats from all three countries and closely follow field dynamics. I try to understand and interpret the evolving interests within this triangle.

This sincere personal background has served as a great introduction—not only to your career but also to the civil society landscape of the past 20 years. I believe you should start writing your memoirs soon, while your memories are still so vivid.

Let’s begin our discussion from a current point: I’d like to ask what kind of restructuring you’ve observed in the region following the 2020 Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. But of course, it’s not really possible to overlook the historical background, is it? What do you think?

The historical context continues to impact positions today.  Both Armenia and Azerbaijan tend to focus on their own past losses, and that complicates peacebuilding. 

In the 1990s, Armenian forces took over not only Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts, which deeply traumatized Azerbaijani society. Regaining control of these territories—in 2020 and then again in 2023—brought Azerbaijan a sense of confidence and relief. You can feel it on the streets. I’ve visited the reclaimed regions frequently over the past few years. In places like Ağdam, all that’s left are ruins stretching out under a heavy silence. The air is crisp and clean. The first priority has been demining. Reconstruction has also moved rapidly, with Turkish firms in the forefront of major infrastructure and development projects. New modern roads, villages, and towns are being built. But how many of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people, now settled in Baku and elsewhere, want to return? It’s hard to know. 

I was in Baku in April 2025, attending an event where President Aliyev spoke. He emphasized that for 30 years, Azerbaijan was ready to compromise, but Armenia wouldn’t return even the surrounding districts where ethnic Armenians had not lived. He also criticized Western leaders for double standards—urging him over the years to accept territorial losses and move on, while later showing far greater sensitivity to Armenian losses once Azerbaijan regained land.

Given their own years of feeling defeated and humiliated, today Azerbaijan seems to resent the current pressure to swiftly conclude a peace deal. The prevailing attitude is: “We will move on our own terms, at our own pace.” Aliyev’s remarks carried a tone of bitterness toward the West—perhaps reflecting an expectation of recognition or acknowledgment. He communicates a sense that Azerbaijan received little support for years, that violation of the country’s territorial integrity were overlooked, and that now, after having to reclaim land by own means, Western actors continue to lean more toward Armenian positions than they ever did toward Azerbaijan’s.

Moreover, after the Azerbaijani public had been prepared for war for such a long time, reversing this mindset is a challenge. There was an anti-Armenia mobilisation embedded from which a turnaround requires changing societal codes. However, Aliyev’s rhetoric toward Armenia are still rather harsh in tone. Considering the militarisation as well, some question whether Baku prioritises peacebuilding at this stage.

On the other hand, the mass exodus of more than 100,000 Armenians from Karabakh has been a profound trauma for Armenian society. When I visited Yerevan shortly after the war, the atmosphere was one of grief and disorientation. Although Karabakh is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, it was home to the Armenians who were uprooted, and reopened wounds from the events of 1915. It also created a deep sense of vulnerability—rooted in the perception that Turkey was instrumental in Azerbaijan’s victory, while Russia failed to come to their defense.

But I must say, the perception I pick up sometimes that Armenia is now in such a weakened position that it will cave to any pressure is not grounded. When I visited Yerevan in May 2025, the city was more vibrant than I had ever seen it. The economy was bustling. Sanctions on Russia have led some international companies to reroute trade through Armenia, and the influx of skilled Russians and Ukrainians has injected visible momentum into certain sectors.

Considering the observations you've shared, what are your thoughts on the peace agreement reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia in March 2025? How might the signing and implementation of the agreement unfold? As far as I’ve been following, some obstacles have also emerged that could prevent it from being signed.

The agreement of the peace deal text, which consists of four pages and seventeen articles, marks a significant turning point in the resolution of the over 30-year-old conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The fact that this text was shaped through a bilateral process, without external actors' such as Russia or the U.S mediation., is particularly noteworthy in terms of local ownership.
However, when the agreed text will be signed remains uncertain. Both sides are shifting the responsibility to each other: Yerevan says, "We are ready to sign immediately," while Baku demands a change in their constitution removingreferences to the declaration of independence which advocates for Nagorno-Karabakh's unification with Armenia - before agreeing to sign., because Azerbaijan interprets this as a challenge to its territorial integrity.

Actually, the Pashinyan administration has accepted Azerbaijan's control over Karabakh and no longer discusses the return of displaced Armenians. His stated goal is to establish relations, open borders, promote economic integration, and ensure Armenia's security is not under threat. Many believe that this constructive and pragmatic approach should be met with positive steps, taking into account that it Pashinyan is unable to demonstrate the benefits of this policy to his people, there is a risk of a return to power by ultra-nationalist, Russia-aligned, or diaspora-supported elites.

However, making the demanded constitutional changes at this stage may also carry political risk for Pashinyan. Changing the constitution under Baku's insistence is sensitive in Armenian society and could strengthen the opposition. Furthermore, elections are coming up next year.  Although Pashinyan has said he will implement constitutional changes after the elections, Baku remains skeptical. They do not trust that Pashinyan, who previously had hardline positions on Karabakh, has truly changed, and view him as opportunistic. Some speculate that Pashinyan could change his stance or lose his position,  and that Yerevan could shift its position with new demands if an opportunity arises. Therefore, they insist that Armenia's abandonment of Karabakh must be accepted through a referendum of a constitutional change, assuming this would make the decision more durable. So, the issue hinges on sequencing. While Pashinyan would rather the peace deal be signed first, Baku wants to see the constitutional amendments first, using its current upper hand to secure its gains. 

Some key figures in Yerevan are concerned that Baku’s demands will not end there. They fear that Baku may later link the peace deal and the opening of borders to other conditions, such as limiting Armenia's arms purchases or curbing its deepening relations with the EU. As a result, deep mutual distrust persists, leading to a stalemate.

As I mentioned in my talk at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, while the demand to remove what Azerbaijan calls "revisionist references" to Karabakh in the Armenian constitution is understandable, the truth is, this will not eliminate such aspirations. Even if the constitution is amended, it is unrealistic to expect that those who have long harbored the dream of reclaiming Karabakh will suddenly abandon it. The removal of language from legal texts does not guarantee an end to territorial disputes. Perhaps, opening the borders could be a more effective or durable antidote to so-called revanchism. When people engage with each other and economic interdependence begins to form, parties may more likely moderate positions. Of course, there is no guarantee of this. Even with the establishment of normal neighborly relations, it may still be unrealistic to expect all these demands to disappear entirely. The key is to establish dynamics for peace to prevail.

Amid all this complexity; surely, there is the Turkey factor. Recently, we’ve been seeing renewed steps toward rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. How might the direction and pace of the Turkish-Armenian dialogue affect the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process? Is a trilateral peace possible?

In fact, there is a reverse interaction here. The pace of the Turkey-Armenia normalisation is primarily determined by the progress of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process. Ankara is shaping its steps with Yerevan in alignment with Baku's position. As progress is marked between Armenia and Azerbaijan, we can expect the Turkey-Armenia track to gain momentum.

Turkey emphasized in 2021 that it would synchronize its ongoing normalization process with Armenia with the progress on the Azerbaijan-Armenia track. Special envoys were appointed, and some tangible steps were taken, such as the resumption of passenger flights and the opening of air cargo transportation. In July 2022, a decision was taken to open the border for third-country citizens, but this step was not implemented, likely due to not having Baku's consent. 

For Armenia, the priority is the opening of the border with Turkey. Therefore, Ankara has always viewed this issue as a lever, with the perspective: "If we open the border, Armenia will not withdraw from Azerbaijan's occupied territories." Azerbaijan is not just an ethnic linguistic cultural kin, but also a strategic partner, key to the Middle Corridor stretching from Central Asia to Europe. The Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship is deep and multilayered, comparable to the relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. or the U.S. and Israel. Especially after 2010, Baku strengthened this relationship by establishing deeper ties with political elites, the public, and business circles in Turkey; it created multilayered interdependencies. Today, Ankara aligns with Baku, and the pace it determines. 

From the start the closure of the Turkey-Armenia border in 1993 was an act of Turkish solidarity with Azerbaijan. After Armenia advanced to Kelbajar in 1993, Ankara halted negotiations with Yerevan, and since then, no diplomatic relations have been established, and the border has remained closed.  Perceiving the international community as showing little interest in Azerbaijan's territorial losses and displaced populations, Ankara held on to the "border opening carrot" as a pressure tool. Although this policy did not yield results for years, it played a role in Armenia's compromises following the Second Karabakh War.

The opening of the Turkey-Armenia border will not create a significant leap for Turkey economically. Its impact will likely remain confined to the border provinces. Moreover, as long as the Azerbaijan-Armenia border remains closed, the Turkey-Armenia route is a dead-end market for Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's leading construction companies are playing an active role in the reconstruction process in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the issue is not only economic; geopolitics and domestic politics have a strong impact. There is a strong view that Turkey cannot balance Iran and Russia in the region without being tightly aligned with Azerbaijan. As a result, the Turkey-Armenia dialogue is intrinsically linked to the Azerbaijan-Armenia process. This in turn is a challenge for Armenia, as it tries to engage with both actors, its maneuvering space is more limited.

Well then, what is the situation in the debates around transportation routes (connectivity) which may appear to be a more technical and detailed issue, but perhaps plays a determining role in the background?

This issue still remains a significant bottleneck. Azerbaijan expects  "unimpeded access" to connect it with its exclave Nakhchivan,  Zangezur corridor.  Armenia has two main issues: first, defining the "unimpeded access" concept. Yerevan argues that vehicles passing through Armenia on this route should be subject to customs and control procedures as a natural requirement of its sovereignty. The second issue: Armenia advocates for more roads, extending into Armenia's interior to also further benefit its own economy.

Baku may not have the incentive today to accommodate these demands. One concern they voice is that if Pashinyan is nolonger in power, and a more hardline leader comes, or if Russia strengthens its influence over Armenia again, Azerbaijan’s use of this route could be challenged. Therefore, Azerbaijan insists that legal guarantees be provided for free passage.

Physical infrastructure investments are somewhat like a marriage: trust in the country you are connecting with is required, and there must be confidence that these routes will not fall under the influence of powers that might use them to your detriment. Baku does not seem convinced of Armenia’s reliability. But here we face the classic "chicken or egg" dilemma: if Armenia is excluded, the chances of it becoming a reliable and stable country will also decrease.

Recently, Europe's interest in this issue has significantly increased, as the development of new transport corridors that bypass Russia, stretching from Central Asia to Europe, has become a geopolitical priority. For Turkey, it is of great importance that these routes be designed with Turkey as a hub. If Georgia becomes unstable or is exposed to Russia’s influence, having stable ties with Armenia will become even more important.

Considering recent developments, how do you think Armenia’s domestic politics and the approaches of Western countries might influence future processes?

For the past few years, Pashinyan's government has been focused on peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Turkey. In this direction, he developed the concept of "real Armenia," which prioritizes sovereignty and economic development within Armenia's internationally recognized borders. This pragmatic and realistic approach, focuses on cooperation with neighbors instead of claiming rights over lands where Armenians once lived, or being ideologically rooted in past victimhood.

This transformation has been positively received by Ankara. In a recent meeting in Ankara, a diplomat told me, "We would have never imagined we would hear such discourse from an Armenian leader."

However, on the Armenian side,  the church, organized diaspora networks, and opposition groups linked to the former adminsitrations strongly oppose Pashinyan's efforts to transform Armenia’s focus. Whether this new approach will take hold in the society is not for sure.
The relative recovery in the economy and improvements in public services sttengthen Pashinyan’s position. Nevertheless, there is some antipathy towards him from certain sections of society. Despite losing the 2020 war, his winning the 2021 elections was a significant achievement. However, there is no guarantee he will win the 2026 elections; he faces immense pressure both domestically and externally. The possibility of small parties uniting to challenge Pashinyan’s political dominance exists. 

Pashinyan is also seeking economic and security support from the West. If his overtures are not met with receptivity from Baku and Ankara, he could find himself in a vulnerable position. Many believe that once Moscow's position in Ukraine relaxes, Russia will seek to activate its leverages to regain a grip over Armenia.

If Pashinyan were to lose power, a new  adminsitration could adopt a more hardline approach towards Turkey and Azerbaijan. It would likely be more Russia-aligned—although many in society remain distant from Moscow due to its lack of support during the war. Thus, the West is interested in strengthening Pashinyan’s position. And they argue that the opening of Turkey’s borders is the most direct way to achieve that.

How high is the risk that the window of opportunity opened for peace and stability will close soon if positive and effective steps are not taken in the near future?

I wouldn't want to make a definitive judgment, but I do think this risk has increased. Geopolitical balances may shift, and on the other hand, societal impatience in Armenia is growing. We may look back and regret not taking action while there was a chance for it. 

Thinking of opening the border as a reward to Armenia or believing that they should suffer more because of their revanchist cirlces,  could lead to a lose-lose outcome. Actors seeking to exploit Armenia’s vulnerabilities or limit Turkey’s regional influence might take advantage of this situation. These actors could include Iran, Russia, or certain Western countries uneasy with Turkey’s potential influence.

However, there are of course counterarguments to my position out there. Some suggest that a more authoritarian and Russia-aligned leader in Armenia might be beneficial for Aliyev and possibly even Turkey, providing a comfort zone for Baku to deal with a leader less eager for EU integration or democratic norms. They argue that this could also make it easier for Baku and Ankara to continue their established balancing act between Russia and the West in the region.

Others believe that Baku's seemingly maximalist expectations stem from overconfidence after winning the war. 

It is not possible to know for sure whether Aliyev is awaiting demands he sees as legitimate to be met, or has a vengeance, or if he anticipates more incentives from the U.S., Russia, or other actors. 

The way I see it, its beneficial for both Azerbaijan and Turkey if Armenia feels more secure and has economic lifelines under a pragmatic leadership. Yes, opening the borders and regional integration require trust, but trust may be harder to develop unless these steps are taken. 

Given Armenia’s economic and security fragilities, it seeks support from the West to meet its needs, which further increases Baku's insecurity, especially as it views France, a leading Western actor in the region, as adversarial to its position.

In short, while the reservations of both leaders are understandable, they lead to  a vicious cycle of mutual distrust. 

We have discussed state policies and international interactions in depth. Could you also share some of your observations regarding social relations and civil society efforts? In the early 2000s, we witnessed tremendous momentum in civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. Is it possible to speak of the same energy today?

In comparison to the Turkey-Armenia normalisation efforts of 2008-2010, the process that’s been underway since 2021 has little civil society engagement or public diplomacy. Special envoys were appointed, high-level meetings took place between heads of state, and ministries of foreign affairs took some concrete steps. However, the interaction between decision-makers and civil society remained very limited, and public participation has lagged. At some point, normalization will need to advance not only at the state level, but also through broader efforts to build trust between societies.

That said, there is valuable civil society work ongoing. Civil society cooperation between Armenia and Turkey, especially since the early 2000s, has been supported largely by Western governments and foundations. Since 2009, the European Union has been a key financier. Projects among journalists, academics, artists, and youth groups have kept communication channels open, especially given lack of diplomatic relations. However, these projects have not been able to sway decision-makers or wider society, nor were they joined by think tanks or civil society organizations close to decision-makers.

Some key Armenian actors  spent time in Turkey through the Hrant Dink Foundation’s exchange programs, and this is an example of the multiplier effect of such projects. However, this impact is mainly observed on the Armenian side, with a more limited mark in Turkey.

There are in general significant asymmetries between the societies of Turkey and Armenia. Turkey is a larger country with far more foreign policy files and disputes. Every time I visit Armenia, I am struck by how closely the ordinary people follow Turkey. In contrast, Armenia is much less prominent on the agenda in Turkish society. This asymmetry was also revealed in a recent field study. In Turkey, Armenia-related issues are overshadowed by more pressing matters such as Syria, Ukraine, or the PKK conflict. This creates a widespread perception in Armenia of Turkish indifference to relations. This imbalance is also reflected in expert circles and civil society projects. Turkish civil society at large does not systematically engage with Armenia. 

The 2020-2023 Azerbaijan-Armenia war also impacted Turkey-Armenia civil society work in a way that still lingers. A number of Armenian civil society actors have been critical of their counterpart Turkish NGOs for not speaking out enough during the war and not questioning Ankara's role. However, these criticisms seem to  overlook the pressures on Turkish civil society and the increasingly shrinking civic space. There may also be another dimension: Armenian civil society representatives, who long preferred not to discuss Karabakh with Turkish counterparts, might not have aligned with Turkish counterparts regarding whether Azerbaijan’s positions had legitimacy when it came to its losses in the Karabakh conflict. While Armenian NGOs have kept their traumas around 1915 on the agenda, avoiding conversation of Azerbaijani losses may have created an impression on the Turkish side of double standards.  

In recent Turkey-Armenia dialogues I’ve taken part in, practical ideas have been discussed alongside ongoing cultural projects. These include fostering ties between economic actors or municipalities near the border; highlighting the potential peace dividends of opening the border; launching joint tourism initiatives in Eastern Anatolia and Armenia that could engage the diaspora; promoting reciprocal media coverage to deepen public understanding; and creating trilateral platforms for civil society actors from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey to convene.

However, if the border opening is not imminent, such efforts may struggle to gain meaningful traction. Moreover, if expectations are raised, they could backfire and deepen disappointment. With the opening of the border hinged on Baku's approval,  and its timing uncertain, creating an expectation that it will happen soon might increase the current mistrust. Especially in Armenia, this could  reinforce the feeling of "again, hope was given but nothing changed."

A final but important topic, and also relevant to the theme of our site: how influential are women politicians and decision-makers in the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan triangle?

In high level decision-making, as with many other foreign policy issues, key figures in Turkey-Armenia relations are predominantly male. However, there are important women in the foreign ministries of both countries. (That said, when it comes to access to the leader, there are more women in Pashinyan's circle compared to Ankara.) In civil society work, women are much more prominent in both Armenia and Turkey. Women are strongly represented individually in projects related to culture, art, media, and academia. If the process expands more broadly to civil society level, or if normalization occurs at the state level, the voices of women will become more prominent.